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Abstract
A (layered) broadcast approach is studied for the fading wiretap channel without
the channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter. Two broadcast schemes, based
on superposition coding and embedded coding respectively, are developed to encode
information into a number of layers and use stochastic encoding to keep the correspond-
ing information secret from an eavesdropper. The layers that can be successfully and
securely transmitted are determined by the channel states to the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper. The advantage of these broadcast approaches is that the trans-
mitter does not need to know the CSI to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper,
but the scheme still adapts to the channel states of the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper. Three scenarios of block fading wiretap channels with a stringent delay
constraint are studied, in which either the legitimate receiver’s channel, the eavesdrop-
per’s channel, or both channels are fading. For each scenario, the secrecy rate that
can be achieved via the broadcast approach developed in this paper is derived, and
the optimal power allocation over the layers (or the conditions on the optimal power
allocation) is also characterized. A notion of probabilistic secrecy is also introduced
and studied for scenarios when the eavesdropper’s channel is fading, which character-
izes the probability that a certain secrecy rate of decoded messages is achieved during
one block. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the impact of the channel
state information at the transmitter and the channel fluctuation of the eavesdropper
on the average secrecy rate. These examples also demonstrate the advantage of the
proposed broadcast approach over the compound channel approach.
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1 Introduction
Physical layer security is a promising technique for providing security protection against
eavesdropping for wireless networks. As a complement to cryptographic techniques, physical
layer security does not use secret keys, but exploits physical channel randomness for secure
transmissions. Such an approach was first introduced and proven to be successful by Wyner
in [2] via the wiretap channel model, and was further extended to a more general broadcast
scenario by Csiszár and Körner in [3]. More recently, there has been surge in interest in
applying this approach to wireless networks (see the recent monographs [4, 5] for overview
of recent work).
As physical layer security exploits physical channel statistics to achieve secure communi-
cation, successful implementation of this approach depends crucially on the transmitter’s
knowledge about the channel state information (CSI), which determines channel statistics
to the legitimate receiver and to the eavesdropper. Previous studies on physical layer secu-
rity have been mostly focused on scenarios in which the CSI is available to the transmitter
although with some exceptions, e.g., [6–9] and the references mentioned below. However, in
wireless networks, such CSI may not be available to the transmitter possibly due to limited
feedback resources. (The receivers, however, may be able to estimate the channel states,
especially for block fading channels as in this paper.) More specifically to security concerns,
eavesdroppers do not generally have incentive to feed their channel states back to transmit-
ters. Thus, the design of physical layer security under channel uncertainty is essential for
effectively implementing this technique. To design and analyze physical layer security under
channel uncertainty, a reasonable approach is to model a system as the compound wiretap
channel with multiple states and guarantee the transmitted message to be decoded and kept
secure under any channel state, in particular under the worst channel state, as studied in,
e.g., [10–14]. An approach similar to the above is to model the system as an arbitrary varying
channel which has been studied in [15, 16]. However, in order to guarantee the performance
for the worst case which may occur only rarely, the channel resources are not used in an
efficient manner if the actual channel state is better than the worst case. The focus of
this paper is on the design of schemes that achieve as a high secrecy rate as the legitimate
receiver’s channel supports, and as the eavesdropper’s channel permits. Since the channel
state is unknown to the transmitter, the problem we address here is to design communication
schemes that do not exploit channel state realizations but still adapt to the actual channel
state that occurs in order to achieve as good of secrecy performance as possible.
Towards this end, a novel (layered) broadcast approach is especially appealing; this ap-
proach has been introduced for wireless systems without secrecy constraints in [17] to im-
prove efficiency of transmission to a mobile receiver, whose channel state is not known at the
transmitter. This methodology is based on superposition coding first introduced in [18] for
broadcast channels. In this strategy, the transmitter splits the entire message into a number
of components with each component being transmitted via one layer of input. These layers of
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inputs are then combined into one channel input using superposition encoding. The receiver
decodes the layers one after another via successive interference cancelation. The realization
of the channel state of the receiver determines up to which layer the receiver can decode.
More layers of messages can be decoded if the receiver’s channel state is better. Hence, with
a fixed coding scheme that does not require the transmitter to know the receiver’s channel
state, such an approach still offers the receiver to obtain as many layers of messages as its
instantaneous channel state supports. We also note that the notion of the broadcast ap-
proach addressed in [17] has been conceptually extended and streamlined by introducing the
variable-to-fixed channel coding in [19].
In this paper, we generalize the broadcast approach in [17] to the fading wiretap channel,
in which both legitimate receiver and eavesdropper’s channels are time-varying block fading
channels. The channel states are constant over one block and change independently across
blocks. In particular, the CSI, i.e., the instantaneous channel realization, is not known at
the transmitter, and is known only at the corresponding receiver. A delay constraint is
assumed so that messages must be transmitted within one block, i.e., coding across blocks
as in [6] is not allowed. Our goal is to design transmission schemes such that the legitimate
receiver decodes more information as its channel gets better, and out of information decoded
at the legitimate receiver, more information is kept secure from the eavesdropper, as the
eavesdropper’s channel gets worse. We wish to characterize the rate of information that is
decodable at the legitimate receiver and is secure from the eavesdropper. In particular, the
performance measure of interest here is the delay-limited secrecy rate averaged over a long
time range. This is different from the outage performance studied in [20–22], which focused
on the delay-limited rate only over a short time range (say one coherence block).
We first develop two types of broadcast approaches respectively for two simpler fading
channel scenarios in which only one of the channel is fading. These two approaches are
then combined to study the general scenario in which both channels are fading. In the first
scenario, only the legitimate receiver’s channel is fading and the eavesdropper’s channel is
constant. For this scenario, the entire message is split into a number of layers with each layer
employing stochastic encoding [2,3] (also see [4, Section 2.3]) to achieve secrecy. These layers
are then combined using superposition coding. Depending on its channel state, the legitimate
receiver can decode messages up to a certain layer. Since the eavesdropper’s channel is
constant, all layers of messages are guaranteed to be kept secure from the eavesdropper via
the stochastic encoding. We show the secrecy guarantee by computing the equivocation rate
of the messages given the output at the eavesdropper. Based on this approach, we derive the
average secrecy rate over a large number of blocks for a given power allocation across the
layers of messages. We then employ the Euler equation derived in the calculus of variations
to characterize the optimal power allocation to achieve optimal average secrecy rate.
In the second scenario, only the eavesdropper’s channel is fading and the legitimate re-
ceiver’s channel is constant. In contrast to the first scenario, in which layers of messages
are encoded into codewords in different subcodes, here all layers of messages are encoded
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into one codeword in an embedded fashion as in [23]. Each layer of message corresponds
to one index that identifies the codeword. In particular, lower layers of messages serve as
randomization for protecting higher layer of messages from the eavesdropper. Depending on
the eavesdropper’s channel state, down to certain layers of messages are kept secure from the
eavesdropper. We show the secrecy guarantee by computing the equivocation rate of these
layers of messages given the output at the eavesdropper. Since the legitimate receiver’s
channel is fixed, the entire codeword is decodable by the legitimate receiver, and hence all
layers of messages are decodable. Based on this approach, we derive the average secrecy
rate over a large number of blocks. We further show that the secrecy rate achieved this
broadcast approach is the best secrecy rate that the instantaneous channel allows although
the transmitter does not know the eavesdropper’s CSI. The only sacrifice due to no CSI at
the transmitter is that some lower layer messages may not be kept secure from the eaves-
dropper. This is in contrast to the first type broadcast approach developed for the case
when the legitimate receiver has a fading channel, for which all messages transmitted over
the channel are guaranteed to be kept secure from the eavesdropper, but the secrecy rate
achieved may not be optimal.
For the third scenario with both channels to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
undergo fading, we combine the two types of broadcast approaches developed before. In
particular, the entire message is split into layers identified by two-dimensional index pairs
(say along horizonal and vertical index directions). For a given state of legitimate receiver
(i.e., a fixed horizonal index), all layers of messages are encoded via the vertical indices
into one codeword in an embedded fashion via the broadcast approach developed for the
second scenario, and codewords with different horizonal indices are then encoded together
via the broadcast approach developed for the first scenario. Depending on its channel state,
the legitimate receiver can decode messages up to a certain layer indexed by a horizonal
index. Also depending on the eavesdropper’s channel state, messages down to a certain
layer indexed by a vertical index can be kept secure from the eavesdropper. We show the
secrecy guarantee by computing the equivocation rate of the messages given the output at
the eavesdropper for any eavesdropper’s channel state. Thus, the layers of messages that
are both decodable by the legitimate receiver and are kept secure from the eavesdropper
contribute to the secrecy rate. Based on this scheme, we derive the average secrecy rate over
a large number of blocks for a given power allocation across the layers of messages. We also
employ the Euler equation developed in the calculus of variations to characterize necessary
conditions for an optimal power allocation to achieve the optimal average secrecy rate. We
also illustrate the structure of the optimal power allocation via a numerical example.
We note that from the three scenarios mentioned above, it is clear that the broadcast
approach does not guarantee that all transmitted messages are kept secure from the eaves-
dropper for all eavesdropper’s states for the scenarios when the eavesdropper experiences a
fading channel. The actual eavesdropper’s channel state realization determines which layers
of messages are secure, and the probability that such a state occurs determines the proba-
bility of achieving the corresponding secrecy rate. We hence introduce and study a notion
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of probabilistic secrecy, which characterizes the probability that certain layers of decoded
messages are kept secure, i.e., the probability that the corresponding secrecy rate is achiev-
able. Furthermore, probabilistic secrecy also suggests that our broadcast approach protects
different layers of messages unequally with higher layers of messages being more likely to be
secure. Hence, for scenarios in which multiple messages with heterogeneous security demands
need to be simultaneous transmitted over the channel, the messages with higher levels of
security demands should be encoded into layers with larger indices so that these messages
are less likely to be learned by the eavesdropper. We also note that probabilistic secrecy is
different from deterministic secrecy required for the classical wiretap channel [2], the fading
wiretap channels (see, e.g., [6,24,25]), and the compound wiretap channel (see, e.g., [10–14]),
in which all decoded messages by the legitimate receiver are guaranteed to be secure (with
probability one).
We finally provide numerical examples to demonstrate the impact of the CSI at the trans-
mitter and the channel fluctuation of the eavesdropper on the average secrecy rate. These
numerical results suggest that the legitimate receiver’s CSI affects the secrecy rates much
more than the eavesdropper’s CSI. Without the legitimate receiver’s CSI, the transmitter
has to spread its power to accommodate a number of possible state realizations, and such
power spreading reduces the secrecy rate. However, the eavesdropper’s CSI affects mostly
the legitimate receiver’s knowledge about which layers of messages are secure, but does not
affect much the amount of information that is kept secure from the eavesdropper. Another
important factor that affects the secrecy rate is the channel fluctuation (i.e., fading) of the
eavesdropper, which creates opportunities for achieving better secrecy rates.
We finally note that this study is different from the recent study in [26]. This study
applies the conceptual idea of the original broadcast approach in [17] of transmitting layers
of messages, but the actual coding scheme is different from that in [17] by incorporating
stochastic coding either for each layer of messages or in an embedded fashion to guarantee
secrecy for messages. Hence, secrecy is achieved solely via the broadcast approach, and
no further feedback from the legitimate receiver is allowed to assist secrecy achievement.
However, the study in [26,27] uses the original coding scheme in [17] for signal transmission,
which does not guarantee secrecy, and secrecy of messages is achieved by allowing feedback
from the legitimate user.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our system model.
In Sections 3, 4, and 5, we study three scenarios in more detail. In Section 6, we provide
numerical examples. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper with some comments on
future directions. We note that although the first two scenarios are special cases of the third
scenario, they are presented separately for developing two types of broadcast approaches that
are useful for the general scenario. Including these two scenarios also helps to understand
the combined approach for the third scenario.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the fading wiretap channel.
2 System Model
In this paper, we study the fading wiretap channel (see Fig. 1), in which a transmitter sends a
message to a legitimate receiver and wishes to keep this message secret from an eavesdropper.
Both the legitimate receiver’s and the eavesdropper’s channels are corrupted not only by
additive complex Gaussian noise, but also by multiplicative fading gain coefficients. The
channel input-output relationship for one channel use is given by
Y = HX +W and Z = GX + V (1)
where X is the input from the transmitter, Y and Z are outputs at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper respectively, H and G are fading channel gain coefficients, and the
noise variables W and V are proper complex Gaussian random variables with zero means
and unit variances. The noise variables are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
over channel uses. The fading gain H and G are assumed to experience block fading, i.e,
they are constant within a block and change independently across blocks. The block length
are assumed to be sufficiently long such that one codeword can be successfully transmitted
if properly constructed. The channel input is subject to an average power constraint P over
each block, i.e.,
1
n
n
∑
i=1
E
[
|Xi|
2
]
≤ P (2)
where i denotes the symbol time (i.e., channel use) index, and where n is the blocklength.
It is assumed that the transmitter does not know the instantaneous channel state infor-
mation, and each receiver knows its own channel state. Each message is required to be
transmitted within one block, i.e., the message is transmitted under a delay constraint. The
legitimate receiver is required to decode the transmitted message with a small probability of
error at the end of each block, and the message needs to be kept as secure as possible from
the eavesdropper. The measure of security is based on the equivocation rate given by
1
n
H(W |Zn) (3)
where Zn is the received outputs at the eavesdropper over one block, and hence depends on
the channel state realization of the eavesdropper during this block. The message W is kept
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secure from the eavesdropper during one block if there exists a positive ǫn that approaches
zero as n goes to infinity such that
1
n
H(W |Zn) ≥
1
n
H(W )− ǫn.
In this paper, it is not required that all messages transmitted over the channel be perfectly
secure. However, our performance measure is the secrecy rate, which is the rate of the
messages that are kept secure from the eavesdropper. If all messages transmitted over one
block are viewed as a single message, then our performance measure can be interpreted as the
level of secrecy achieved for this message. Furthermore, we are interested in characterizing
the secrecy rate under the delay constraint, but averaged over a large number of blocks, i.e.,
the average secrecy rate over blocks.
We also introduce the notion of probabilistic secrecy, which characterizes the probability
that a certain secrecy rate of decoded messages can be achieved during a block, i.e., decoded
messages at a certain rate can be kept secure from the eavesdropper. Such a probabilistic
manner arises because the eavesdropper’s channel is random and unknown to the transmitter,
and hence encoding at the transmitter may not guarantee all messages decoded by the
legitimate receiver to be secure from the eavesdropper at any eavesdropper’s state. The
state of the eavesdropper determines which messages are kept secure, and the probability
that such a state occurs determines the probability of achieving the corresponding secrecy
rate.
3 Fading Channel to Legitimate Receiver
In this section, we study the case in which only the legitimate receiver experiences a block
fading channel, i.e., H is a constant over one block and changes independently to another
realization from one block to another. The channel to the eavesdropper is assumed to be a
constant, i.e., G is fixed and is hence known to every node. The transmitter does not know
the instantaneous channel state to the legitimate user, but the legitimate receiver is assumed
to know the channel state. In the sequel, we first develop a layered broadcast approach for
the case with a discrete fading state and then generalize the approach to the case with a
continuous fading state.
3.1 Discrete Legitimate Channel States
We first consider the case in which the legitimate receiver has a finite number of channel
states, i.e., H may take L values, say H1, . . . , HL with |H1| ≤ |H2| ≤ · · · ≤ |HL|. For
this channel, we propose a (layered) broadcast approach, which generalizes the approach
introduced in [17] for the broadcast channel without secrecy constraints. More specifically,
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the entire message is split into L parts, i.e., L layers of messages denoted by Wl for l =
1, . . . , L.
Definition 1. A secrecy rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) is achievable if there exists a coding scheme
that encodes the messages W1, . . . ,WL at the rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) such that for l =
1, . . . , L, the legitimate receiver decodes Wl with a small probability error if its channel real-
ization is Hl, and all messages W1, . . . ,WL are kept secure from the eavesdropper.
The following theorem characterizes secrecy rate tuples that can be achieved by a broadcast
approach.
Theorem 1. For the fading wiretap channel with the legitimate receiver having one of the L
fading states H1, . . . , HL, where |G| < |H1| ≤ |H2| ≤ · · · ≤ |HL|, and with the eavesdropper
having a fixed channel state G, the following secrecy rate tuples (R1, . . . , RL) are achievable:
Rl = log
(
1 +
|Hl|
2Pl
1 + |Hl|2
∑L
k=l+1 Pk
)
− log
(
1 +
|G|2Pl
1 + |G|2
∑L
k=l+1 Pk
)
, l = 1, . . . , L (4)
where Pl denotes the transmission power assigned for transmitting Wl and satisfies the power
constraint
∑L
l=1 Pl ≤ P .
Remark 1. For the case when the legitimate receiver also has a fixed fading state (i.e., the
channel now is the Gaussian wiretap channel), the total secrecy rate of all messages following
from Theorem 1 is optimal. Hence, the broadcast approach that we develop (see the proof of
Theorem 1) is optimal for the Gaussian wiretap channel.
We note that in this degraded setting, since messages decoded by a receiver with a worse
channel state should also be decoded by the receiver with a better channel state, the legit-
imate receiver at the channel state Hl can decode W1, . . . ,Wl if (R1, . . . , RL) is achievable.
Hence, the total rate of the messages that the legitimate receiver at the state Hl can decode
is given by
l
∑
j=1
Rj =
l
∑
j=1
[
log
(
1 +
|Hj|
2Pj
1 + |Hj|2
∑L
k=j+1 Pk
)
− log
(
1 +
|G|2Pj
1 + |G|2
∑L
k=j+1 Pk
)]
=
l
∑
j=1
[
log
(
1 +
|Hj|
2Pj
1 + |Hj|2
∑L
k=j+1 Pk
)]
− log
(
1 +
|G|2
∑l
k=1 Pk
1 + |G|2
∑L
k=l+1 Pk
)
. (5)
We also note that the second term in (4) seems to suggest that the eavesdropper may also
decode the current layer by removing interference caused by the layers that it has decoded.
However, this interpretation is misleading. We will show below that the eavesdropper does
not obtain any information about the messages W1, . . . , WL, i.e., perfect secrecy is achieved
for all layers of messages.
We next provide the proof of the above theorem, which describes the layered broadcast
approach in more detail.
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Figure 2: A codebook for the broadcast approach.
Proof of Theorem 1. We consider a codebook that contains L subcodebooks corresponding
to L layers (see Fig. 2). For each layer l, the subcodebook Cl contains 2
nR̃l codewords xnl (wl)
indexed by wl = 1, . . . , 2
nR̃l, where
R̃l = log
(
1 +
|Hl|
2Pl
1 + |Hl|2
∑L
k=l+1 Pk
)
, (6)
1
n
∑n
i=1 x
2
li(wl) ≤ Pl for wl = 1, . . . , 2
nR̃l, and
∑L
l=1 Pl ≤ P . These codewords are divided
into 2nRl bins, where
Rl = log
(
1 +
|Hl|
2Pl
1 + |Hl|2
∑L
k=l+1 Pk
)
− log
(
1 +
|G|2Pl
1 + |G|2
∑L
k=l+1 Pk
)
. (7)
The encoding scheme is described as follows. In order to transmit a message tuple
(w1, . . . , wL), for each l, the message wl is mapped into the wlth bin in the subcodebook
Cl, and one codeword x
n
l in the bin is randomly chosen with a uniform distribution over the
entire bin. The final input transmitted over the channel is given by
xn =
L
∑
l=1
xnl .
Following steps similar to those in [4, Section 2.3], it can be shown that there exists a code-
book as described above such that if this codebook and the encoding scheme as described
above are applied to the Gaussian wiretap channel with the channels to the legitimate re-
ceiver and the eavesdropper respectively being at the state Hl and G, the legitimate receiver
can successfully decodeW1, . . . , Wl with a small probability of error. Furthermore, the eaves-
dropper can successfully decode Xnl with a small probability of error if it knows W1, . . . ,Wl
for all l = 1, . . . , L. In particular, this property implies that there exists a positive δn which
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approaches zero as n goes to infinity such that
H(Xn1 |Z
n,W1) ≤ nδn (8)
H(Xn2 |Z
n,W1,W2) ≤ nδn (9)
...
H(XnL|Z
n,W1, . . . ,WL) ≤ nδn. (10)
We next show that all layers of the messages are kept secure from the eavesdropper.
Towards this end, we compute the following equivocation rate:
H(W1, . . . ,WL|Z
n)
= H(W1, . . . ,WL, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(W1, . . . ,WL, Z
n, Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L)−H(X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L|W1, . . . ,WL, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(W1, . . . ,WL, X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L) +H(Z
n|W1, . . . ,WL, X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L)
−H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L|W1, . . . ,WL, Z
n)−H(Zn)
≥ H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L) +H(Z
n|Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L)−H(X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L|W1, . . . ,WL, Z
n)−H(Zn). (11)
It is clear from the codebook structure and the encoding scheme that Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L are
independent and each Xnl is uniformly distributed over the codewords in the subcodebook
Cl for l = 1, . . . , L. We note that throughout the paper, all messages are assumed to be
uniformly distributed over its alphabet space. Hence,
H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L) = n
L
∑
j=1
R̃j. (12)
Using (8)-(10), we obtain
H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L|W1, . . . ,WL, Z
n) < nǫn (13)
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where ǫn approaches zero as n goes to infinity. We also compute
H(Zn|Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L)−H(Z
n) (14)
≥ n log 2πe−
n
∑
i=1
logVar(Zi)
= n log 2πe−
n
∑
i=1
log 2πe
(
|G|2
L
∑
l=1
Var(Xli) + 1
)
(15)
≥ n log 2πe−
n
∑
i=1
log 2πe
(
|G|2
L
∑
l=1
E[|Xli|
2] + 1
)
≥ n log 2πe− n log 2πe
(
|G|2
n
n
∑
i=1
L
∑
l=1
E[|Xli|
2] + 1
)
(16)
≥ n log 2πe− n log 2πe
(
|G|2
L
∑
l=1
Pl + 1
)
≥ −n log
(
1 + |G|2
L
∑
l=1
Pl
)
(17)
where (15) follows because Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L are independent, and (16) follows from Jensen’s
inequality. Combining (12), (13) and (17), we obtain
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WL|Z
n) ≥
L
∑
j=1
R̃j − log
(
1 + |G|2
L
∑
l=1
Pl
)
− ǫn
=
L
∑
j=1
Rj − ǫn
=
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WL)− ǫn (18)
which implies that perfect secrecy is achieved asymptotically as n approaches infinity.
3.2 Continuous Legitimate Channel State
In this subsection, we generalize our result for the discrete fading channel to the continuous
fading channel. We still assume that only the legitimate receiver’s channel is block fading
and the eavesdropper’s channel is fixed. Hence, the legitimate receiver’s channel gain H can
take continuous values. For each channel state H = h, we let s = |h|2, and use s as an
index for the layer of the message that is intended for the legitimate receiver at the state
h to decode. For each layer s, we assume that the transmitter allocates power ρ(s)ds. We
11
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use Σ(s) to denote the total power allocated to the layers corresponding to better channel
states, i.e., the states ŝ such that ŝ > s. Hence,
Σ(s) =
∫ ∞
s
ρ(x)dx, (19)
and
ρ(s) = −Σ′(s). (20)
The following result on the average secrecy rate follows directly by applying Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. For the fading wiretap channel with the legitimate receiver having a block
fading channel with continuous states and the eavesdropper having a fixed channel state at
G, the average secrecy rate under the delay constraint achieved via a broadcast approach is
given by
R = max
Σ(x)
log e
∫ ∞
|G|2
(1− F (x))
[
−xΣ′(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
+
|G|2Σ′(x)
1 + |G|2Σ(x)
]
dx (21)
where f(·) is the probability density function of the fading state s, and F (·) is the cumulative
distribution function of s.
Proof of Corollary 1. Following from (4), we obtain the following secrecy rate corresponding
to layer s = |h|2. If s > |G|2, then the secrecy rate is given by
dR = log
(
1 +
sρ(s)ds
1 + sΣ(s)
)
− log
(
1 +
|G|2ρ(s)ds
1 + |G|2Σ(s)
)
≈ log e
[
sρ(s)ds
1 + sΣ(s)
−
|G|2ρ(s)ds
1 + |G|2Σ(s)
]
(22)
where the second approximate equation follows because ds approaches zero. If s ≤ |G|2,
then dR = 0.
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It can be seen that if the legitimate receiver’s channel is at state s, then it can decode
messages corresponding to all layers x if x ≤ s (see Fig. 3). Hence, the total secrecy rate
achievable if the legitimate receiver’s channel is at state s is given by
R(s) = log e
∫ s
|G|2
xρ(x)dx
1 + xΣ(x)
−
|G|2ρ(x)dx
1 + |G|2Σ(x)
. (23)
Averaging the above rate over all fading state realizations of the legitimate receiver’s channel,
we obtain
R =
∫ ∞
|G|2
f(s)R(s)ds (24)
= log e
∫ ∞
|G|2
(1− F (x))
[
xρ(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
−
|G|2ρ(x)
1 + |G|2Σ(x)
]
dx
where f(·) is the probability density function of the fading state s, and F (·) is the cumulative
distribution function of s. The above average rate can be further improved by optimizing
over power allocations ρ(·), or equivalently Σ(·). We can also use (20) to replace ρ(x) in the
final equation for the average rate, which completes the proof.
To obtain the optimal average rate R given in (21) and the corresponding optimal power
allocation function Σ(·), we study the following optimization problem. In particular, we
focus on continuous power allocation functions, i.e., Σ(·) is a continuous function defined
over [0,∞).
max
Σ(x)
∫ ∞
|G|2
S(x,Σ(x),Σ′(x))dx
subject to 0 ≤ Σ(x) ≤ P, Σ′(x) ≤ 0, for x ≥ 0 (25)
where
S(x,Σ(x),Σ′(x)) = (1− F (x))
[
−xΣ′(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
+
|G|2Σ′(x)
1 + |G|2Σ(x)
]
. (26)
The following theorem characterizes the structure of the optimal power allocation function.
Theorem 2. Let
η(x) =
1− F (x)− (x− |G|2)f(x)
xf(x)(x− |G|2)− (1− F (x))|G|2
. (27)
An optimal solution to (25), if one exists, has the following structure. There exist 0 ≤ x1 <
y1 < x2 < y2 < · · · < xn < yn = x0, such that η(x) is strictly decreasing over [xi, yi] for
i = 1, . . . , n, η(x1) = P , η(yn) = η(x0) = 0, η(yi) = η(xi+1) for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, and
Σ∗(x) =









P 0 ≤ x ≤ x1;
η(x) xi ≤ x ≤ yi, for i = 1, . . . , n;
η(yi) = η(xi+1), yi < x < xi+1, for i = 1, . . . , n− 1;
0 yn = x0 ≤ x.
(28)
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Remark 2. The functions Σ(x) that satisfy the conditions given in Theorem 2 may not be
unique.
Remark 3. In Theorem 2, yn = x0 may be infinity.
Proof of Theorem 2. It is clear that any optimal Σ∗(x) if one exists must have the following
form:
Σ∗(x) =









P 0 ≤ x ≤ x1;
a strictly decreasing function xi ≤ x ≤ yi, for i = 1, . . . , n;
a constant, yi < x < xi+1, for i = 1, . . . , n− 1;
0 yn = x0 ≤ x.
(29)
where 0 ≤ x1 < y1 < x2 < y2 < · · · < xn < yn = x0.
The optimization problem (25) is a problem of the constrained calculus of variation. We
thus apply the technique in [28] to provide a necessary condition that Σ∗(x) satisfies. Over the
intervals (x1, y1], [xi, yi] for i = 2, . . . , n−1, and [xn, yn), since Σ
∗(x) is strictly decreasing, it
does not satisfy the inequality constraints in (25) with equality, i.e., it is not on the boundary
of the constraint set. Due to the complementary slackness conditions [28], the following Euler
equation must be satisfied:
SΣ −
d
dx
SΣ′ = 0, (30)
where
SΣ =
∂S(x,Σ(x),Σ′(x))
∂Σ
, and SΣ′ =
∂S(x,Σ(x),Σ′(x))
∂Σ′
.
For the function S(x,Σ(x),Σ′(x)) given in (26), we obtain
SΣ = (1− F (x))
[
x2Σ
′
(x)
(1 + xΣ(x))2
−
|G|4Σ′(x)
(1 + |G|2Σ(x))2
]
SΣ′ = (1− F (x))
[
−x
1 + xΣ(x)
+
|G|2
1 + |G|2Σ(x)
]
d
dx
SΣ′ =
xf(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
−
f(x)|G|2
1 + |G|2Σ(x)
+ (1− F (x))
[
x2Σ
′
(x)− 1
(1 + xΣ(x))2
−
|G|4Σ
′
(x)
(1 + |G|2Σ(x))2
]
.
We substitute the above equations into the Euler equation and obtain
Σ∗(x) = η(x) =
1− F (x)− (x− |G|2)f(x)
xf(x)(x− |G|2)− (1− F (x))|G|2
, (31)
over the intervals (x1, y1], [xi, yi] for i = 2, . . . , n−1, and [xn, yn). This also implies that η(x)
must be strictly decreasing over these intervals. Due to the continuity of Σ∗(x), the values
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of Σ∗(x) over (yi, xi+1) are given by η(yi) = η(xi+1) for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, which also implies
that η(x) must satisfy η(yi) = η(xi+1) for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Also due to the continuity of
Σ∗(x), η(x1) = P , and η(yn) = η(x0) = 0.
Example 1. In this example, we consider the case when the channel to the legitimate receiver
experiences Rayleigh fading. Hence, s = |H|2 is exponentially distributed, and
f(x) =
1
σ1
e
− x
σ1 and F (x) = 1− e
− x
σ1 , x ≥ 0 (32)
where σ1 is the parameter of the exponential distribution.
Substituting (32) into (27), we obtain
η(x) =
σ1 − x+ |G|
2
x(x− |G|2)− σ1|G|2
. (33)
By solving η(x1) = P and η(x0) = 0, we obtain
x0 = σ1 + |G|
2, and
x1 =
(P |G|2 − 1) +
√
(P |G|2 − 1)2 + 4P (Pσ1|G|2 + |G|2 + σ1)
2P
. (34)
It is easy to check that |G|2 < x1 < x0. We also note that η(x) is strictly decreasing over
the range [x1, x0], because the numerator of η(x) is decreasing, and the denominator of η(x)
is increasing over the interval [x1, x0]. Since x1 and x0 are both unique solutions to η(x1) = P
and η(x0) = 0, respectively, and η(x) is strictly decreasing over [x1, x0], the optimal Σ
∗(x) is
thus given by
Σ∗(x) =





P 0 ≤ x ≤ x1;
η(x) x1 ≤ x ≤ x0;
0 x0 ≤ x.
(35)
Since the above Σ∗(x) is the unique function that satisfies the conditions given in Theorem
2, it is the only possible optimal solution for the power allocation function.
By taking the derivative of Σ∗(x), we obtain
ρ∗(x) = −Σ∗′(x) =
−x2 + 2σ1x− 2σ1|G|
2 + 2|G|2x− |G|4
(x(x− |G|2)− σ1|G|2)2
. (36)
By substituting Σ∗(x) and Σ∗′(x) to (21), we can obtain the optimal average secrecy rate
via a broadcast approach for the Rayleigh fading channel. Numerical results are provided in
Section 6.
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4 Fading Channel to Eavesdropper
In this section, we study the case in which only the eavesdropper experiences a block fading
channel, i.e., G is a constant over each block, and changes independently from one block
to another. The legitimate receiver’s channel gain H is assumed to be a constant, and is
thus known to all nodes. As for the case in which only the legitimate receiver’s channel is
fading, it is assumed that the transmitter does not know the instantaneous channel state
to the eavesdropper, but the eavesdropper knows its own channel state. In the rest of this
section, we first study the case with a discrete fading state, and then generalize our result
to the case with a continuous fading state.
4.1 Discrete Eavesdropping Channel States
We first consider the case in which the eavesdropper has a finite number of channel states,
i.e., G may take L values, say G1, . . . , GL with |G1|
2 < |G2|
2 < · · · < |GL|
2 < |H|2. For
this case, we develop a second type of broadcast approach that is different from the one
developed in Section 3. To proceed, we start by splitting the entire message into L layers of
messages W1,W2, . . . ,WL.
Definition 2. A secrecy rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) is achievable if there exists a coding scheme
that encodes W1, . . . ,WL at the rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) such that the legitimate receiver can
decode all messages with a small probability of error, and message Wl is kept secure from the
eavesdropper if the eavesdropper’s channel state is Gl for l = 1, . . . , L.
The following theorem characterize achievable secrecy rate tuples via a broadcast approach.
Theorem 3. Consider the fading wiretap channel with the legitimate receiver having a fixed
channel state H and the eavesdropper possibly having one of L fading states G1, . . . , GL with
|G1|
2 < |G2|
2 < · · · < |GL|
2 < |H|2. The following secrecy rate tuples (R1, . . . , RL) are
achievable:
Rl = log
(
1 + |Gl+1|
2P
)
− log
(
1 + |Gl|
2P
)
, for l = 1, . . . , L− 1, and
RL = log
(
1 + |H|2P
)
− log
(
1 + |GL|
2P
)
. (37)
Since the messages that are secure from the eavesdropper with the state Gj are also secure
from the eavesdropper with the state Gl if |Gj| > |Gl|, all Wl, . . . ,WL are secure from the
eavesdropper at the state Gl if (R1, . . . , RL) is achievable. Hence, the total rate of the
messages that are secure from the eavesdropper at the channel state Gl is given by
Rl +Rl+1 + · · ·+RL = log
(
1 + |H|2P
)
− log
(
1 + |Gl|
2P
)
. (38)
It is also clear that the secrecy rate given in (38) achieved by the second type broadcast
approach (described in the proof for Theorem 3) is the best secrecy rate (i.e., the secrecy
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capacity) that the instantaneous channel allows although the transmitter does not know
the eavesdropper’s CSI. The only sacrifice due to no CSI at the transmitter is that some
lower layer messages may not be kept secure from the eavesdropper. This is in contrast to
the first type broadcast approach developed for the case when the legitimate receiver has
a fading channel, for which all messages transmitted over the channel are guaranteed to be
kept secure from the eavesdropper, but the secrecy rate achieved may not be optimal.
We note that although the legitimate receiver does not know the eavesdropper’s channel
state, the broadcast approach still prevents the eavesdropper from knowing certain layers
of information with these layers determined by the eavesdropper’s channel state. However,
without knowing the eavesdropper’s channel state, the legitimate receiver understands only
the probability that certain layers of messages are kept secure, which is referred to as prob-
abilistic secrecy and is studied in the following subsection.
We next provide the details of the proof for Theorem 3, in which the second type broadcast
approach is developed in detail.
Proof of Theorem 3. In contrast to the broadcast approach developed for proving Theorem
1 that employs a subcodebook for each layer of messages, the broadcast approach here
generalizes the embedding code structure proposed in [23] that uses only one codebook.
Each codeword is indexed by a random index and all layers of messages. Depending on the
channel state of the eavesdropper, up to certain layers of messages jointly with the random
index serve as randomness to protect the remaining higher-layer messages. In this way, these
higher-layer messages can be viewed as a vector bin number, and the lower-layer messages
and the random index can be viewed as the index (vector) of the codeword within each bin.
In particular, the entire code can be viewed in an embedded fashion in that each layer of
messages serve as bin numbers with the corresponding bins being embedded into larger bins
indexed by messages one layer higher. We describe this codebook in more detail as follows.
We construct a codebook that contains 2n log(1+|H|
2P) codewords xn, which are indexed by
(q, w1, . . . , wL−1, wL) with
q = 1, 2, . . . , 2n log(1+|G1|
2P),
w1 = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n[log(1+|G2|2P)−log(1+|G1|2P)],
w2 = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n[log(1+|G3|2P)−log(1+|G2|2P)],
...
wL−1 = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n[log(1+|GL|2P)−log(1+|GL−1|2P)],
wL = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n[log(1+|H|2P)−log(1+|GL|2P)]. (39)
Using this codebook, to transmit a message tuple (w1, w2, . . . , wL), the encoder randomly
selects an index q with the uniform distribution and transmits xn(q, w1, w2, . . . , wL). To
connect this approach to the wiretap binning scheme, here, for an eavesdropper’s channel
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state Gl, the codewords in the codebook can be viewed as being assigned to the bins indexed
by (wl, . . . , wL).
Due to the codebook structure specified in (39) and following steps similar to those in [4,
Section 2.3], it can be shown that there exists a codebook with the above structure such that
if this codebook and the above encoding scheme are applied, then the legitimate receiver
can decode Xn, and hence W1, . . . ,WL, with a small probability of error. Furthermore, for
l = 1, . . . , L, if the eavesdropper’s channel state is Gl, then the eavesdropper can decode the
channel input Xn with a small probability of error if it knows Wl, . . . ,WL. We note that this
property implies that there exists a positive δn which approaches zero as n goes to infinity
such that
H(Xn|Zn1 ,W1, . . . ,WL) ≤ nδn,
H(Xn|Zn2 ,W2, . . . ,WL) ≤ nδn,
...
H(Xn|ZnL,WL) ≤ nδn, (40)
where Zl is the channel output at the eavesdropper if its channel state is Gl for l = 1, . . . , L.
From the codebook construction and the above property, it is clear that the legitimate
receiver can decode all layers of messages. It is then sufficient to show that for each channel
state realization Gl, the eavesdropper is kept ignorant of the messages Wl, . . . ,WL for l =
1, . . . , L. Towards this end, we compute the following equivocation rate:
H(Wl, . . . ,WL|Z
n
l )
= H(Wl, . . . ,WL, Z
n
l )−H(Z
n
l )
= H(Wl, . . . ,WL, Z
n
l , X
n)−H(Xn|Wl, . . . ,WL, Z
n
l )−H(Z
n
l )
= H(W1, . . . ,WL, X
n) +H(Znl |Wl, . . . ,WL, X
n)
−H(Xn|Wl, . . . ,WL, Z
n
l )−H(Z
n
l )
≥ H(Xn) +H(Znl |X
n)−H(Xn|Wl, . . . ,WL, Z
n
l )−H(Z
n
l ). (41)
By the codebook construction and encoding scheme, and the fact that the messages are
uniformly distributed, we obtain
H(Xn) = n log
(
1 + |H|2P
)
. (42)
Using (40), we obtain
H(Xn|Wl, . . . ,WL, Z
n
l ) ≤ nδn. (43)
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We also compute
H(Znl |X
n)−H(Znl )
≥ n log 2πe−
n
∑
i=1
logVar(Zli)
= n log 2πe−
n
∑
i=1
log 2πe
(
|Gl|
2
Var(Xi) + 1
)
≥ n log 2πe−
n
∑
i=1
log 2πe
(
|Gl|
2E[|Xi|
2] + 1
)
≥ n log 2πe− n log 2πe
(
|Gl|
2
n
n
∑
i=1
E[|Xi|
2] + 1
)
≥ n log 2πe− n log 2πe
(
|Gl|
2P + 1
)
≥ −n log(1 + |Gl|
2P ). (44)
Substituting (42), (43), (44) into (41), we obtain
1
n
H(Wl, . . . ,WL|Z
n
l ) ≥ log
(
1 + |H|2P
)
− log(1 + |Gl|
2P )− δn
=
L
∑
j=l
Rj − δn =
1
n
H(Wl, . . . ,WL)− δn (45)
which implies that perfect secrecy is achieved asymptotically as n approaches infinity.
We note that the broadcast approach developed above is different from the original broad-
cast approach [17] and the one developed in Section 3 in that the power is not spread
over layers of messages because one codebook that contain information about all layers of
messages is employed. Furthermore, our scheme generalizes the embedding scheme in [23]
(that treats the scenario with two eavesdropper’s channel states) to the broadcast approach
with multiple-layer embedding to accommodate multiple eavesdropper’s channel states. This
scheme is further extended for the case with infinite number of layers in the following sub-
section. More importantly, our scheme with multiple-layer embedding does not result in
reduction in the secrecy rate due to the single codebook design and no power spreading over
layers.
4.2 Continuous Eavesdropping Channel State
We now generalize the result in the preceding subsection to the case in which the eavesdropper
has a continuous channel state, i.e., the channel gain G takes continuous values. In this case,
the message should be encoded correspondingly to a continuum of layers. For each state
G = g, we let u = |g|2, and use u as an index for the layer of the message that needs to be
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Figure 4: An illustration of the layers of messages that are secure from the eavesdropper.
kept secure from the eavesdropper in the state g. The following result follows directly from
Theorem 3.
Corollary 2. For the fading wiretap channel with the legitimate receiver having a fixed
channel state H and the eavesdropper having a block fading channel, the average secrecy rate
under the delay constraint achieved via a broadcast approach is given by
R = Q(|H|2) log
(
1 + |H|2P
)
−
∫ |H|2
0
q(u) log(1 + uP )du (46)
where q(·) and Q(·) are the probability density function and cumulative distribution function
of |G|2, respectively.
We note that the above rate R can be easily computed numerically.
Proof of Corollary 2. Following from (38), the total secrecy rate when the eavesdropper’s
channel state is u = |G|2 is given as follows (see Fig. 4):
R(u) =
{
log (1 + |H|2P )− log(1 + uP ), if u < |H|2
0, otherwise.
(47)
Averaging the above rate over all eavesdropper’s channel state realizations, we obtain
R =
∫ |H|2
0
q(u)R(u)du
=
∫ |H|2
0
q(u)
[
log
(
1 + |H|2P
)
− log(1 + uP )
]
du (48)
= Q(|H|2) log
(
1 + |H|2P
)
−
∫ |H|2
0
q(u) log(1 + uP )du, (49)
which concludes the proof.
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Based on the above proof, we now characterize probabilistic secrecy for this scenario, i.e.,
the probability that a given secrecy rate R is achievable, denoted by Pr(R). It is clear from
(47) that if R is greater than the maximum rate log (1 + |H|2P ) decodable at the legitimate
receiver, Pr(R) = 0. Otherwise, in (47), we set R(uR) = R to obtain
uR =
2log(1+|H|
2P)−R − 1
P
which is the best eavesdropper’s state such that messages with the rate R are still secure.
Since these messages are also secure for any eavesdropper’s state u ≤ uR, Pr(R) should
be equal to Pr{u ≤ uR}, which is Q(uR), i.e., the cumulative probability distribution of u
evaluated at uR. In summary, Pr(R) is given by
Pr(R) =
{
Q (uR) for R ≤ log (1 + |H|
2P ) ;
0 otherwise.
5 Fading Channels to Both Legitimate Receiver and
Eavesdropper
In this section, we study the general case, in which both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper experience block fading channels, i.e., H and G are constant over each block,
and change independently to other realizations from one block to another. It is assumed that
the transmitter knows neither the instantaneous channel state to the legitimate receiver nor
the channel state to the eavesdropper, but the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper know
their corresponding channel states. As in the previous sections, we start with the case when
the channel gains have finite numbers of states. We then study the case with continuous
channel states.
5.1 Discrete Legitimate and Eavesdropping Channel States
We first consider the case in which both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have
finite numbers of channel states, i.e., H and G take one of H1, . . . , HL values and one of
G1, . . . , GK values, respectively, where |H1| < · · · < |HL| and |G1| < · · · < |GK |. For each
1 ≤ l ≤ L, we use Kl to denote the largest index of the state level of G that is below Hl,
i.e., Kl = max|Gk|≤|Hl| k. We develop a broadcast approach that combines the two broadcast
approaches developed in Sections 3 and 4. We first split the entire message into a number
of components Wl[1,Kl] for 1 ≤ l ≤ L, where Wl[1,Kl] denotes Wl1, . . . ,WlKl.
Definition 3. A secrecy rate tuple {Rl[1,Kl]}l=1,...,L is achievable if there exists a coding
scheme that encodes the messages Wl[1,Kl] at the rates Rl[1,Kl] for 1 ≤ l ≤ L such that if the
legitimate receiver’s channel is at Hl and the eavesdropper’s channel is at Gk for 1 ≤ l ≤ L
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and 1 ≤ k ≤ Kl, then the legitimate receiver decodes the message Wlk and the eavesdropper
is kept ignorant of the message Wlk.
The following theorem characterizes achievable secrecy rate tuples via a broadcast ap-
proach.
Theorem 4. For the fading wiretap channel with the legitimate receiver having one of
L fading states H1, . . . , HL with |H1| < · · · < |HL| and the eavesdropper having one of
K fading states G1, . . . , GK with |G1| < · · · < |GK |, the following secrecy rate tuples
(R1,[1,K1], . . . , RL[1,KL]) are achievable:
Rlk =










log
(
1 +
|Gk+1|
2Pl
1+|Gk+1|2
∑L
j=l+1 Pj
)
− log
(
1 + |Gk|
2Pl
1+|Gk|2
∑L
j=l+1 Pj
)
, for 1 ≤ l ≤ L,
1 ≤ k ≤ Kl − 1
log
(
1 + |Hl|
2Pl
1+|Hl|2
∑L
j=l+1 Pj
)
− log
(
1 +
|GKl |
2Pl
1+|GKl |
2
∑L
j=l+1 Pj
)
, for 1 ≤ l ≤ L, k = Kl
(50)
where Pl denotes the transmission power assigned to state l and satisfies the power constraint
∑L
l=1 Pl ≤ P .
We note that since the messages that are decodable by the legitimate receiver at any state
Hj can also be decoded by the legitimate receiver at the state Hl if |Hj| < |Hl|, the legitimate
receiver at the state Hl can decode all messages W1[1,K1], . . . ,Wl,[1,Kl] for l = 1, . . . , L. And
since the messages that are secure from the eavesdropper with any state Gj are also secure
from the eavesdropper with the state Gk if |Gj | > |Gk|, all W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL] are secure
from the eavesdropper at the state Gk.
We also note that similarly to the case in which only the channel to the eavesdropper is
fading, employment of the broadcast approach does not require that the legitimate receiver
know the channel state to the eavesdropper. However, without knowing the eavesdropper’s
channel state, the legitimate receiver understands only the probability that certain layers of
messages are kept secure, which is studied in the following subsection as probabilistic secrecy.
Proof of Theorem 4. The basic idea combines the two types of broadcast approaches devel-
oped in Sections 3 and 4. The details are as follows.
We consider a codebook that contains L subcodebooks corresponding to L layers of the le-
gitimate receiver’s channel. For each layer l, the subcodebook Cl contains 2
n log
(
1+
|Hl|
2Pl
1+|Hl|
2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)
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codewords xnl indexed by (ql, wl1, wl2, . . . , wlKl), where
ql = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n log
(
1+
|G1|
2Pl
1+|G1|
2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)
,
wl1 = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n
[
log
(
1+
|G2|
2Pl
1+|G2|
2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)
−log
(
1+
|G1|
2Pl
1+|G1|
2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)]
,
wl2 = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n
[
log
(
1+
|G3|
2Pl
1+|G3|
2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)
−log
(
1+
|G2|
2Pl
1+|G2|
2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)]
,
...
wl(Kl−1) = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n
[
log
(
1+
|GKl
|2Pl
1+|GKl
|2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)
−log
(
1+
|GKl−1
|2Pl
1+|GKl−1
|2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)]
,
wlKl = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n
[
log
(
1+
|Hl|
2Pl
1+|Hl|
2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)
−log
(
1+
|GKl
|2Pl
1+|GKl
|2
∑L
j=l+1
Pj
)]
. (51)
The encoding scheme is given as follows. To transmit a set of messages w1[1,K1], . . . , wL,[L,KL],
for each l = 1, . . . , L, the transmitter randomly and uniformly selects ql, and ql together with
wl[1,kl] determines a codeword x
n
l (ql, wl1, . . . , wlKl). The input transmitted over the channel
is then given by
xn =
L
∑
l=1
xnl (ql, wl1, . . . , wlKl).
Following steps similar to those in [4, Section 2.3], it can be shown that there exists a
codebook as described above such that if the legitimate receiver has the channel state Hl,
then it can decode Xn1 , . . . , X
n
l , and hence the messages W1[1,K1], . . . ,Wl[1,Kl], with a small
probability of error, and if the eavesdropper’s channel is at Gk, then the eavesdropper can
successfully decode Xnl with a small probability of error if it knows Wl[k,Kl] and X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
l−1,
for l = 1, . . . , L. More formally, this property implies that there exists a positive δn which
approaches zero as n goes to infinity such that for k = 1, . . . , K,
H(Xn1 |Z
n
k ,W1[k,K1]) ≤ nδn
H(Xn2 |Z
n
k ,W2[k,K2], X
n
1 ) ≤ nδn
...
H(XnL|Z
n
k ,WL[k,KL], X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L−1) ≤ nδn (52)
where Znk denotes the channel output received by the eavesdropper if its channel state is Gk.
From the codebook construction, it is clear that if the legitimate receiver has a chan-
nel realization Hl, it can decode X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
l , and hence the messages W1[1,K1], . . . ,Wl[1,Kl].
It is then sufficient to show that if the eavesdropper is in the state Gk, the messages
W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL] are kept secure from the eavesdropper. Towards this end, we com-
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pute the following equivocation rate:
H(W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL]|Z
n
k )
= H(W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL], Z
n
k )−H(Z
n
k )
= H(W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL], Z
n
k , X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L)
−H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L|W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL], Z
n
k )−H(Z
n
k )
= H(W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL], X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L) +H(Z
n
k |W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL], X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L)
−H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L|W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL], Z
n
k )−H(Z
n
k )
≥ H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L) +H(Z
n
k |X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L)
−H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L|W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL], Z
n
k )−H(Z
n
k ). (53)
Following from the codebook construction and the encoding scheme, it is clear that
Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L are independently and uniformly distributed over their corresponding subcode-
books. Hence, we obtain
H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L) = n
L
∑
l=1
log
(
1 +
|Hl|
2Pl
1 + |Hl|2
∑L
j=l+1 Pj
)
. (54)
Using (52), we obtain
H(Xn1 , . . . , X
n
L|W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL], Z
n
k ) < nǫn (55)
where ǫn approaches zero if n goes to infinity. Following the steps in (14)-(17), we obtain
H(Znk |X
n
1 , . . . , X
n
L)−H(Z
n
k ) ≥ −n log
(
1 + |Gk|
2
L
∑
j=1
Pj
)
. (56)
Hence,
1
n
H(W1[k,K1], . . . ,WL[k,KL]|Z
n
k )
≥
L
∑
l=1
log
(
1 +
|Hl|
2Pl
1 + |Hl|2
∑L
j=l+1 Pj
)
− log
(
1 + |Gk|
2
L
∑
j=1
Pj
)
− ǫ
=
L
∑
l=1
[
log
(
1 +
|Hl|
2Pl
1 + |Hl|2
∑L
j=l+1 Pj
)
− log
(
1 +
|Gk|
2Pl
1 + |Gk|2
∑L
j=l+1 Pj
)]
− ǫ (57)
where the last step applies
log
(
1 + |Gk|
2
L
∑
j=1
Pj
)
=
L
∑
l=1
log
(
1 +
|Gk|
2Pl
1 + |Gk|2
∑L
j=l+1 Pj
)
Comparing equation (57) with the rates of the messages given in (51), we conclude that
perfect secrecy is achieved asymptotically as n approaches infinity.
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Figure 5: An illustration of the layers of messages that are decodable at the legitimate
receiver and secure from the eavesdropper.
5.2 Continuous Channel States
We now generalize our result in the preceding subsection to the case in which the channel
states take continuous values. For each channel state pair (H,G) = (h, g), we let (s, u) =
(|h|2|, |g|2), and use (s, u) to index layers of messages. For each layer s, we assume that the
transmitter allocates power ρ(s)ds, and we use Σ(s) to denote the total power allocated to
the layers with better channel states, i.e., the states ŝ such that ŝ > s. Hence,
Σ(s) =
∫ ∞
s
ρ(x)dx (58)
and
ρ(s) = −Σ′(s). (59)
Following from Theorem 4, we obtain the following result on the average secrecy rate.
Corollary 3. For the fading wiretap channel with both the legitimate receiver and the eaves-
dropper having block fading channels with continuous channel states, the average secrecy rate
under the delay constraint achieved via a broadcast approach is given by
R = max
Σ(x)
log e
∫ ∞
0
dx(1− F (x))Σ′(x)
[
−xQ(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
+
∫ x
0
du
uq(u)
1 + uΣ(x)
]
(60)
where F (·) and Q(·) are cumulative distribution functions for s and u, respectively.
Proof of Corollary 3. Consider the case when the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
have the channel states (s, u) = (|h|2, |g|2). Following from (50), if s > u, then the rate of
the messages that can be decoded by the legitimate receiver at the state s while being kept
secure from the eavesdropper at the state u is given by
dR = log
(
1 +
sρ(s)ds
1 + sΣ(s)
)
− log
(
1 +
uρ(s)ds
1 + uΣ(s)
)
≈ log e
[
sρ(s)ds
1 + sΣ(s)
−
uρ(s)ds
1 + uΣ(s)
]
(61)
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where the second equation follows because ds approaches zero. If s ≤ u, then dR = 0. Since
all messages corresponding to the legitimate receiver’s state x such that x < s can be decoded
by the legitimate receiver at state s, the total rate of the messages that can be decoded by
the legitimate receiver at the state s and also be kept secure from the eavesdropper at the
state u is given by
R(s, u) = log e
∫ s
u
[
xρ(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
−
uρ(x)
1 + uΣ(x)
]
dx (62)
if s > u, and R(s, u) = 0 if s ≤ u. An illustration of the layers of messages that contribute
to the secrecy rate R(s, u) is depicted in Fig. 5.
Averaging the above rate over all fading state realizations of the legitimate receiver’s
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, we obtain
R =
∫ ∞
0
ds
∫ s
0
duf(s)q(u)R(s, u)
= log e
∫ ∞
0
du
∫ ∞
u
dsf(s)q(u)
∫ s
u
dx
[
xρ(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
−
uρ(x)
1 + uΣ(x)
]
= log e
∫ ∞
0
duq(u)
∫ ∞
u
dxρ(x)
[
x
1 + xΣ(x)
−
u
1 + uΣ(x)
]
∫ ∞
x
dsf(s)
= log e
∫ ∞
0
duq(u)
∫ ∞
u
dx(1− F (x))ρ(x)
[
x
1 + xΣ(x)
−
u
1 + uΣ(x)
]
= log e
∫ ∞
0
dx(1− F (x))ρ(x)
[
x
1 + xΣ(x)
∫ x
0
duq(u)−
∫ x
0
du
uq(u)
1 + uΣ(x)
]
= log e
∫ ∞
0
dx(1− F (x))ρ(x)
[
xQ(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
−
∫ x
0
du
uq(u)
1 + uΣ(x)
]
, (63)
where F (·) and Q(·) are cumulative distributions for s and u, respectively. The average
rate R given above can be further improved by optimizing over all possible power allocation
functions ρ(·), or equivalently, over all possible cumulative power allocation functions Σ(·).
We can also use (59) to replace ρ(x) with −Σ′(x), which concludes the proof.
As in Section 4, we can also characterize the probability that a given secrecy rate R is
achievable, denoted by Pr(R). By setting u = 0 in (62), we obtain the following total rate
of the messages that the legitimate receiver at the state s can decode:
R(s) = log e
∫ s
0
xρ(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
dx.
We set R(sT ) = R, and can numerically obtain sT , which represents the lowest state of the
legitimate receiver that can decode the messages at the rate R. If s < sT , the probability
of achieving the secrecy rate R when the legitimate receiver’s state is in s is zero, i.e.,
Pr(R|s) = 0. Otherwise, for any state s ≥ sT , we characterize the probability that the given
secrecy rate R is achievable. Towards this end, we set R(s, uR) = R in (62), and then fix s
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and solve the equation to obtain uR(s), which is a function of s. Such uR(s) exists because
R(s, u) in (62) is monotonic as a function of u, and can be found numerically. It is clear that
uR(s) is the best eavesdropper’s state such that messages with the rate R are secure. Since
these messages are also secure in any eavesdropper’s state û ≤ uR(s), Pr(R|s) = Q(uR(s)).
Thus, the total probability Pr(R), which is the probability that the messages with the given
rate R are secure from the eavesdropper, can be obtained by averaging P (R|s) over all states
s ≥ sT , and is given by
Pr(R) =
∫ ∞
sT
f(s)Q(uR(s))ds.
From the legitimate receiver’s point of view, since it knows its own channel state, the con-
ditional probability P (R|s) = Q(uR(s)) characterizes the probability to achieve a certain
secrecy rate R at the current block with the state s = |H|2.
In order to obtain the optimal average secrecy rate R given in (60), we need to solve the
following optimization problem:
max
Σ(x)
∫ ∞
0
S(x,Σ(x),Σ′(x))dx
subject to 0 ≤ Σ(x) ≤ P, Σ′(x) ≤ 0, for x ≥ 0; (64)
where
S(x,Σ(x),Σ′(x))
= (1− F (x))Q(x)
−xΣ′(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
+ (1− F (x))Σ′(x)
∫ x
0
uq(u)
1 + uΣ(x)
du. (65)
Theorem 5. An optimal solution to (64), if one exists, has the following structure. There
exist 0 ≤ x1 < y1 < x2 < y2 < · · · < xn < yn = x0, and a function η(x), such that η(x)
satisfies
(1− F (x))Q(x)
(1 + xη(x))2
=
xf(x)Q(x)
1 + xη(x)
− f(x)
∫ x
0
uq(u)
1 + uη(x)
du (66)
and is strictly decreasing over [xi, yi] for i = 1, . . . , n, η(x1) = P , η(yn) = η(x0) = 0,
η(yi) = η(xi+1) for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, and an optimal Σ
∗(x) is given by
Σ∗(x) =









P 0 ≤ x ≤ x1;
η(x) xi ≤ x ≤ yi, for i = 1, . . . , n;
η(yi) = η(xi+1), yi < x < xi+1, for i = 1, . . . , n− 1;
0 yn = x0 ≤ x.
(67)
Proof. The argument is similar to that for proving Theorem 2. Hence, we here provide
only details for obtaining the Euler condition (66). Due to the complementary slackness
conditions, over the intervals (x1, y1], [xi, yi] for i = 2, . . . , n − 1, and [xn, yn), since Σ
∗(x)
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does not satisfy the inequality constraints with equality, i.e., it is not on the boundary of
the constraint set, then the following Euler equation must be satisfied:
SΣ −
d
dx
SΣ′ = 0. (68)
For the function S(x,Σ(x),Σ′(x)) given in (65), we obtain
SΣ =(1− F (x))Q(x)
x2Σ
′
(x)
(1 + xΣ(x))2
+ (1− F (x))Σ′(x)
∫ x
0
−u2q(u)
(1 + uΣ(x))2
du
SΣ′ =(1− F (x))Q(x)
−x
1 + xΣ(x)
+ (1− F (x))
∫ x
0
uq(u)
1 + uΣ(x)
du
d
dx
SΣ′ = [−f(x)Q(x) + (1− F (x))q(x)]
−x
1 + xΣ(x)
+ (1− F (x))Q(x)
−1 + x2Σ′(x)
(1 + xΣ(x))2
− f(x)
∫ x
0
uq(u)
1 + uΣ(x)
du+ (1− F (x))
xq(x)
1 + xΣ(x)
− (1− F (x))
∫ x
0
u2q(u)Σ′(x)
(1 + uΣ(x))2
. (69)
We substitute the above equations into the Euler equation and obtain the condition given
in (66).
Example 2. Consider the case when the channels to the legitimate receiver and the eaves-
dropper experience independent Rayleigh fading, i.e., s and u are exponentially distributed
as characterized by:
f(x) =
1
σ1
e
− x
σ1 and F (x) = 1− e
− x
σ1 , x ≥ 0, (70)
q(x) =
1
σ2
e
− x
σ2 and Q(x) = 1− e
− x
σ2 , x ≥ 0. (71)
where σ1 and σ2 are parameters for the exponential distributions of s and u, respectively.
The Euler condition (66) now becomes
1− e
− x
σ2
(1 + xΣ(x))2
−
x(1 − e
− x
σ2 )
σ1(1 + xΣ(x))
+
1
σ1σ2
∫ x
0
ue
− u
σ2
1 + uΣ(x)
du = 0. (72)
Consider the case with σ1 = σ2 = 1. Following from the above condition, if Σ(x0) = 0, then
x0 satisfies
2− 2e−x0 − x0 = 0
whose root can be computed numerically and is equal to
x0 = 1.5936.
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Figure 6: An optimal function Σ(x) for the Rayleigh fading channel with P = 10dB and
σ1 = σ2 = 1.
Using the condition (72), it is easy to find a Σ∗(x) function that satisfies the necessary
condition given in Theorem 5. We plot the function Σ∗(x) in Fig. 6 for the case with the
power P = 10dB and σ1 = σ2 = 1. We note that this function Σ
∗(x) is strictly decreasing
over the interval [x1, x0], which suggests that the optimal solution is unique if it exists.
This example also demonstrates the impact of probabilistic secrecy, under which we achieve
a positive secrecy rate under delay constraints for certain channel state realizations as demon-
strated in Section 6. However, under a deterministic secrecy constraint that requires all
transmitted messages be secure from the eavesdropper, zero secrecy rate can be achieved for
any block. Even over a large number of blocks, the secrecy rate is zero under a determinis-
tic secrecy constraint if the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have the same channel
statistics whereas the secrecy rate is positive under probabilistic secrecy for the same scenario
as for the above example.
6 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide numerical examples to demonstrate the impact of the CSI at the
transmitter on the average secrecy rate. We also compare the average secrecy rates for the
three scenarios studied in the paper.
We first study scenario 1 as studied in Example 1, in which only the legitimate receiver’s
channel is fading with the Rayleigh distribution and the eavesdropper’s channel is constant.
The distribution of s = |H|2 is exponential with the parameter σ1 = 2, i.e., p(s) =
1
σ1
e−s/σ1 .
The eavesdropper’s channel state is at |G|2 = 0.5. In Fig. 7, we plot the average secrecy
rates achieved via the broadcast approach and compare them with the rates achievable
when the legitimate receiver’s CSI is known at the transmitter and the eavesdropper. With
the legitimate receiver’s CSI at the transmitter, the average secrecy rate (which is also the
capacity) can be obtained by averaging the secrecy rate for each channel state over the state
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Figure 7: Comparison of rates for scenario 1: only the channel to the legitimate receiver is
fading
distribution and optimizing over all possible power allocation over the channel states as given
below
R̄ = max
P (s):Es[P (s)]≤P
∫ ∞
|G|2
[
log (1 + sP (s))− log
(
1 + |G|2P (s)
)]
ρ(s)ds (73)
where the optimizing power allocation can be obtained by using the Lagrangian multiplier
method as in [22, 24].
It is clear from Fig. 7 that the knowledge of the legitimate receiver’s CSI provides a great
advantage to achieve better secrecy rates. Due to the lack of the CSI, the transmitter’s
power is spread over many layers of messages in order to accommodate possibly occurring
channel states. However, when the CSI is available, the transmitter spends all its power for
the particular state realization at each coherence block. In this way, the CSI helps to use the
transmitter’s power more efficiently. We also note that if one adopts the compound channel
approach [13] that requires secrecy no matter which legitimate receiver’s state occurs, then
the secrecy rate for this example is zero. Hence, the broadcast approach greatly improves the
achievable secrecy rate although the transmitter does not have the CSI. We also note that for
this scenario, if there is no delay constraint, even if the transmitter does not know the CSI, it
can exploit the statistics of the legitimate receiver’s channel to achieve a better secrecy rate.
Here, the channel statistics help to avoid power spreading whereas the broadcast approach
inherently degrades the rates due to power spreading over layers.
We then study scenario 2, in which only the eavesdropper’s channel is fading with the
Rayleigh distribution and the legitimate receiver’s channel is constant. The distribution of
u = |G|2 is exponential with the parameter σ2 = 0.5, i.e., p(u) =
1
σ2
e−u/σ2 . The legitimate
receiver’s channel state is at |H|2 = 2. In Fig. 8, we plot the average secrecy rates achieved via
the broadcast approach and compare them with the rates achievable when the eavesdropper’s
CSI is known at the transmitter. With the eavedropper’s CSI at the transmitter, the average
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Figure 8: Comparison of rates for scenario 2: only the channel to the eavesdropper is fading
secrecy rate (which is also the capacity) under the delay constraint is given by
R̄ = max
P (u):Eu[P (u)]≤P
∫ |H|2
0
[
log
(
1 + |H|2P (u)
)
− log (1 + uP (u))
]
q(u)du (74)
where the optimizing power allocation can be obtained by using the Lagrangian multiplier
method as in [22, 24].
It is clear from Fig. 8 that the rates corresponding to the two cases are very close, sug-
gesting that the knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI does not provide much advantage to
achieve better secrecy rates. This is not surprising, as we have seen in Section 4 that the
broadcast approach already achieves the maximum possible secrecy rate for each block. The
small gap between the two rates is because with the CSI, the transmitter can adapt its
power allocation over the channel states to achieve a better rate. Another role that the CSI
plays is that with the CSI the transmitter guarantees secrecy for all transmitted messages,
whereas without the CSI the transmitter does not guarantee secrecy for all transmitted
messages, and the legitimate receiver knows only the probability that a certain secrecy rate
is achievable without the eavesdropper’s CSI. We further note that the secrecy rate that
can be achieved using the compound channel approach is zero for this example due to the
assumption that all transmitted messages must be secure no matter which eavesdropper’s
state occurs. Therefore the broadcast approach adopted here again significantly improves
the secrecy rate. However, unlike the first scenario and the compound channel approach,
the broadcast approach developed here does not guarantee the secrecy of the entire message
and achieves only probabilistic secrecy.
We now study scenario 3 as studied in Example 2, in which both the channel to the
legitimate receiver and the channel to the eavesdropper are fading. The distributions of
s = |H|2 and u = |G|2 are independent and are both exponential with the parameters σ1 = 2
and σ2 = 0.5, i.e., p(s) =
1
σ1
e−s/σ1 and p(u) = 1
σ2
e−u/σ2 , respectively. In Fig. 8, we plot the
average secrecy rates achieved via the broadcast approach and compare them with the rates
achievable when both channels’ CSI is known at the transmitter and the eavesdropper. With
the CSI at the transmitter, the average secrecy rate (which is also the capacity) under the
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Figure 9: Comparison of rates for scenario 3: the channels to both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper are fading
delay constraint is given by
R̄ = max
P (u,s):Es,u[P (s,u)]≤P
∫ ∞
0
ds
∫ s
0
duρ(s)q(u) [log (1 + sP (s, u))− log (1 + uP (s, u))] (75)
where the optimizing power allocation can be obtained by using the Lagrangian multiplier
method as in [22, 24]. From our understanding of scenarios 1 and 2, the gap between the
rates corresponding to the two cases is mainly due to the lack of the legitimate receiver’s
CSI which results in the transmitter’s power being spread over states. Similar to scenario 2,
the secrecy rate that can be achieved using the compound channel approach is zero for this
example. Therefore the broadcast approach adopted here again improves the secrecy rate
although the entire message may not be fully kept secure.
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Figure 10: Comparison of rates for the three scenarios
We finally compare the average secrecy rates for the three scenarios in Fig. 10, all of which
do not have the CSI at the transmitter. It is clear from the figure that scenario 2 has the best
rate, and scenario 3 has a better rate than scenario 1. It is easy to understand that scenario
3 has worse rates than scenario 2 because the transmitter’s power is spread over the states
due to no knowledge of the legitimate receiver’s CSI. However, it may seem counter-intuitive
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that scenario 3 has better rates than scenario 1. This is due to the fact that when the
eavesdropper’s channel is fading, there is a good chance that its state is below the channel
average, and such channel fluctuation facilitates achievement of a better secrecy rate and
overcomes the effect of no eavesdropper’s CSI at the transmitter. Therefore, the two major
factors that affect the secrecy rate are the knowledge of the legitimate receiver’s CSI and
the channel fluctuation of the eavesdropper. The knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI only
weakly affects the secrecy rate.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied a (layered) broadcast approach for fading wiretap channels. We
have developed two broadcast approaches for the cases when either the legitimate receiver’s
or the eavesdropper’s channel is fading, respectively, and have combined these two approaches
for the general cases when both nodes’ channels are fading. For each case, we have obtained
the average secrecy rate achieved under the delay constraint by using the broadcast approach
and have derived the optimal power allocation across layers. We have also introduced a
notion of probabilistic secrecy, and characterized the probability that a given secrecy rate is
achievable for the valid scenarios when the eavesdropper’s channel is fading. Moreover, we
have provided numerical examples to demonstrate how the CSI at the transmitter and the
channel fluctuation of the eavesdropper affect the average secrecy rate. Several directions
are interesting to explore in the future. For the case with a delay constraint, it is of interest
to explore the broadcast approach jointly with a key-based technique recently proposed
in [29]. It is also of interest to study the broadcast approach for the case with a relaxed
delay constraint, in which coding over a few blocks is allowed. Some ideas in [30] may be
further explored for the case with a secrecy constraint. Moreover, it is of great importance
to evaluate the penalty incurred by delay constraints, in particular, a stringent one-block
constraint, by comparing the secrecy rate under a delay constraint and the ergodic secrecy
rate.
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